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In this paper, we hypothesize that loan monitoring costs
increase with distancefrom the borrower, and, thus, that
bankloan portfolio choice depends on the bank's location.
A corollary ofour hypothesis is that branching increases
bankloan portfolio diversification. Toempirically test our
hypothesis, we focus on banks' choice between agri-
cultural and nonagricultural loans. We find that, even
aftercontrollingfor a variety ofotherfactors, rural banks
devote a significantly larger proportion of their loan
portfolioto agriculturalloans than do urban banks. More-
over, wefind that, when statewide branching is permitted,
rural banks hold higher nonagricultural loan portfolio
shares, and urban banks hold higher agricultural loan
portfolio shares, than when branching is restricted. Thus,
we conclude that branching enhances bank loan portfolio
diversification.
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Banking economists have given considerable attention
to the special nature of commercial bank lending. Leland
and Pyle (1977) and Diamond(1984), amongothers, argue
that bank lending differs from other forms of lending, such
as the purchase of debt that is directly issued by com-
panies, because of the extensive information gathering and
monitoring functions that banks perform. These authors
argue that, to a greater extent than other lenders, banks
gather their own detailed information on loan projects and
monitor borrowers' conditions and adherence to loan cove-
nants. Thus, although all lenders attempt to monitor their
loans and enforce loan or debt covenants, banks may
specialize in lending to borrowers who are particularly
costly to monitor.
One implicationof the importanceofbank monitoring is
that a bank's location may be a significant determinant of
its choice of borrowers. It is reasonable to suppose that
monitoring is more difficult and more costly from a dis-
tance, so banks would tend to favor local borrowers over
distant borrowers, all other things equal.
Support for this view comes from the work of Black
(1975), who suggests that deposit relationships with bor-
rowers enhance a bank's ability to monitor.' Black argues
that since bank borrowers often are depositors as well, the
bank has a low-cost ongoing history of financial informa-
tion. Ifdeposit markets are local, as some evidence shows,
then this effect would strengthenthe tie between banks and
local borrowers by reducing monitoring costs."
The dependence of monitoring costs on distance implies
constraints on a bank's ability to expand beyond the
local headquarters area through branching may directly
affect its loan portfolio choice and perhaps its ability to
diversify assets. This is becausebranchingrestrictions may
impinge on the ability of banks to locate offices near
different types of borrowers and thus efficiently monitor
their loans. The effect on diversification is important
because, in many situations, diversification across assets
can reduce expected bankruptcy costs and the probability
ofbank failure.
In this article, we present evidence supporting the
Economic Review / Winter 1991hypothesis that location affects the types of loans that
banks choose, and, consequently, that branching enhances
diversification. We focus on banks' choice between agri-
cultural and nonagricultural loans. This choice is well-
suited to our study because, by its nature, agriculture is
location-specific and concentrated in rural areas.3
Unlikeearlierrelated work, which was limitedto a study
of different types of rural banks, our analysis includes
institutions headquartered in both urban and rural loca-
tions in restricted and unrestricted branching states. Our
results indicate that rural banks have a significantly higher
share of agricultural loans than urban banks, even after
controlling for a variety of otherfactors. Moreover, we find
thatrural banks increase the share of nonagricultural loans
in their portfolios when they are allowed to branch state-
wide, and that urban banks increase the share of agri-
cultural loans in their portfolio when they are allowed to
branch statewide. This offers support for the hypothesis
that branching enhances diversification, and sup-
portthan can be obtainedfrom a study of rural banks alone.
A theoretical model demonstrating the effects of loca-
tion and branching laws on portfolio choice is presented in
Section 1. In Section II, we empirically test the implica-
tions of the theory, examining differences in agricultural
loan shares across a wide selection of commercial banks
over the period 1981-86. Results from the estimation are
described in Section with remarks in
Section IV.
I. Portfolio Model
In this paper, we hypothesize that monitoring costs
increase with distance from the borrower, and, thus, that
a bank's location affects its relative monitoring costs
for different types of loans. Our hypothesis is based on
reasoning that bank personnel are more familiar with local
borrowers and local market conditions, and therefore can
more easily monitor local borrowers than distant ones." In
addition, personnel should be better able to keep a close
watch on a local loan project's progress.
We assume that monitoring costs are important for
banks, so that differences in relative monitoring costs for
different types of loans should influence a bank's loan
portfolio choices. Thus, our hypothesis implies that loca-
tion affects a bank's loan portfolio choices. To test our
hypothesis, we focus on a bank's choice between agricul-
tural and non-agricultural loans. Agricultural borrowers,
by their nature, are assumed to be located in rural areas,
while most nonagricultural loans are assumed to be for
projects in urban areas. Thus, our hypothesis predicts that,
at leastwhenbranching is restricted, banks located in rural
areas will have lower monitoring costs for agricultural
loans than will banks located in urban areas and will
therefore devote a larger proportion of their portfolio to
farm-related lending.
If branching is unrestricted, it may still be the case
that agricultural shares will be higher for rural-head-
quarteredbanks, but we expectthat the difference between
rural and urban banks' agricultural shares will be smaller
than when branching is restricted. This is because branch-
ing should decrease differences in monitoring costs be-
tween agricultural and nonagricultural loans. This would
encourage banks to take advantage of the benefits of
diversification, thereby lowering rural banks' agricultural
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
loan portfolio shares and raising urban banks' agricul-
tural portfolio shares.5
Previous researchers have already conducted some in-
vestigation of these topics. Gilbert and Belongia (1988)
study how rural bank portfolios are affected
tory structure by examining whether affiliation with large
multi-bankbank holding companies affects the proportion
of loans devoted to agriculture in rural banks' portfolios.
In some states, multi-bank bank are
not permitted.
They find that rural banks whichare subsidiaries of bank
holding companies with assets greaterthan $1billion have
a lower agricultural loan ratio than otherbanks in the same
counties. They attribute this to the greater ability that such
banks have to diversify their loan portfolios away from
agriculture. Thus, Gilbert and Belongia's results implicitly
suggest that laws that restrict the geographic dispersion of
bank affiliates or even bank offices also restrict the diver-
sification of rural bank portfolios out of agriculture,
White (1984) suggests that geographic restrictions pre-
vented loan diversification at small rural banks in the
1930s, increasing their failure rate, but he does not em-
pirically test this hypothesis. In their empirical examina-
tion of the effect of bankcredit on farm Calomiris,
Hubbard, and Stock (1986) argue that restric-
tions, by impairing the ability of small rural banks to
diversify assets, may contribute to bank the deple-
tion ofbank credit, and a decline in farm 6
though, they do not empirically test this hvpothesis.
The Model
The effect of location and branching laws on portfolio
choicecan be seenusing a portfoliomodel.7 For simplicity,
25we assume that the amount of monitoring required per
dollar lent is fixed." However,following the above discus-
sion, the cost per dollar of producing the required monitor-
ing depends on the bank's location vis-a-vis the borrower,
or distance from the borrower. Thus, the monitoring cost
for an agricultural loan of a given size will be higher for an
urbanbank than a rural bank. Wealso assume thebank has
a fixed stock of loanable funds to allocate among the two
types of loans, agricultural and nonagricultural.
In the following discussion, we will introduce several
variables that are notchoice variables forthebank. Someof
these variables, namely monitoring costs, interest rates,
and risk-related variables, depend on bank-specific ex-
ogenous factors, such as location, that enter into our
empirical analysis. We will explicitly introduce these
exogenous factors in the next section, but, for the sake of
notational simplicity, we will suppress these factors in the
following formulas.
The explication of the theoretical model proceeds in two
steps, first without uncertainty, and then with uncertainty
added. In the absence of uncertainty, the bank would
allocate all funds to the project yielding the highest return
net of monitoring costs. Since the volume of total loans is
fixed, we can normalize the volume to one. Mathemati-
cally, the decision is simple:
Maximize tt = 6iA+(1-6)iN-6CA-(1-6)CN-rd· (1)
The bank chooses 6, the share of loans made to agri-
cultural projects, so as to maximize profits, rr, net of the
cost of obtaining loanable funds, rd. The interest rates on
agricultural and nonagricultural loans, iA and iN' respec-
tively, and the monitoring costs per dollar for agricultural
and nonagricultural loans, CAand CN' respectively,deter-
mine the optimal allocation. In this simple case, the bank
allocates all credit to the types of projects that pay the
highest interest rate net of monitoring costs.
Now let returns to the two types of projects be randomly
distributed. The random return variables for agricultural
and nonagricultural projects are denoted by rA and rN'
respectively. These are the returns to the project owners
themselves. The expected return and variance may differ
betweenagricultural and nonagricultural project pools, but
we assume that individual project returns within a given
loan pool are drawn from the same distribution. 9
The bank is assumed to be risk-neutral, in the sense that
its objective is simply to maximize expected profits. Port-
folio variance enters the bank's objective function through
bankruptcycosts; weassume that ifthebank cannot payoff
its own liabilities, it will face bankruptcy costs. 10 Because
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the probability of bankruptcy increases as the variance of
the portfolio increases, holding interest rates constant,
expected profits decrease with increased variance. In this
way, uncertainty enters into the allocation decision of
the bank.
The variances of individual project returns will affect
expected profits through the portfolio variance and, inde-
pendently, through a separate channel. The separate, in-
dependent influence is due to the effect of project return
variance on the probability of borrower default. As the
variance of a project's return increases, holding the loan
rate and the expected value of the return constant, the
probability of the borrower defaulting increases. Because
the highest return that the bank can receive is the con-
tracted loan rate, the bank is not compensated on the high
end forthe increase intheprobabilityofdefault. Therefore,
the increase in variance lowers the expected return to the
bank from that particular loan.
The introduction of uncertainty into the model gives the
bank an incentive to diversifyits portfolio and hold someof
both types of loans.'! The principle ofdiversification says
that by making loans to different types of borrowers, the
risk to the lender's portfolio can be reduced in most cases.
Realizations of future eventsthat cause someprojects to be
successful can cause others to fail. Therefore, by combin-
ing different types of loans into the same portfolio, these
offsetting risks cancel to some extent, thus reducing over-
all portfolio variance. Diversification is therefore defined,
in this paper, as an adjustmentof portfolio shares in such a
way as to reduce portfolio variance.12
The decision problem for the bank now becomes the
following:
Maximize Tr = f3iA + (1 O)iN - 6CA - (1- 6)CN
- [3var(6rA+(1 O)rN) - 6aAvar(rA)
- (1-6)aNvar(rN) rd, (2)
where Tr is now expected profits. The effect of portfolio
variance on bankruptcy is captured in the fifth term of (2),
while the independent effects of agricultural and non-
agricultural loan defaults are captured in the sixth and
seventh terms of (2), respectively. Here, [3var(6rA +
(1 6)rN) is the expected cost of bankruptcy, which we
assume rises linearly with the portfolio's variance, and
6aAvar(rA) and (1-6)aNvar (rN) represent the expected
costs associated with the default of agricultural and non-
agricultural loan projects, respectively.
The optimal portfolio forthe bank can be determined by
maximizing (2) with respect to 6 and solving for the
equilibrium value of 6:
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Equation (3) shows that three types of factors affect the
proportion of a bank's portfolio that is devoted to agricul-
ture: interest rate spreads, relative monitoring costs and
relative risk. Holding all other factors constant, anincrease
in the interest rate on agricultural loans (iA) relative to the
rate on nonagricultural loans (iN) will increase agricul-
ture's portfolio share. On the other hand, an increase in
monitoring costs for agricultural loans (CA) relative to
monitoring costs on nonagricultural loans (eN) will de-
crease agriculture's portfolio share. Finally, an increase in
the relative variance of agricultural loan projects or in the
relative cost of agricultural loan project defaults (which
depends on relative variances and the relative sizes of the
parameters (XA and (XN) will decrease agriculture's port-
folio share.
We also can use equation (3) to see the effect of
differences in relative monitoring costs on diversification.
For simplicity, set the interest rates and project return
variances equal on the two types of projects, and set the
covariance between project returns equal to zero. Then,
equation (3) tells us that, in the absence of differences in
monitoring costs between the two types of loans, the
optimal proportionof the portfolio devotedto agriculture is
one-half. Since there are nodifferences ininterestrates and
no differences in monitoring costs to keep the bank from
choosing a perfectly diversified portfolio, this must be the
portfolio of minimum variance. An increase in monitoring
costs for agricultural loans, for example, would decrease e
below one-half. This move awayfrom the minimum vari-
ance portfolio, and into nonagricultural loans, would
decrease portfolio diversification, as we have defined di-
versification.P Similarly, an increase in monitoring costs
fornonagricultural loans would decrease diversification by
decreasing the proportion of the portfolio devoted to non-
agricultural loans.
As seen in equation (3), exogenous variables that affect
relative monitoringcosts, interestrate spreads, and relative
risk, will, in tum, affect the share of a bank's portfolio that
is devoted to agriculture. In the next section we will
empirically examine how observable variables that should
affect these three types of factors actually influence agri-
cultural portfolio shares. Among the factors we will be
examining are:
• Location andbranchingrestrictions. These should affect
relative monitoring costs. For example, banks that are
located in urban areas and are prohibitedfrom setting up
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branches in rural areas will have relatively higher moni-
toring costs for agricultural projects, and, therefore,
lower agricultural loan portfolio shares. In addition, it
maybe the case that evenurbanheadquarteredbanks that
can branch have a comparative disadvantage in agricul-
turallending, relative to rural banks that can branch. 14
However, we expect that, for a given bank, branching
reduces differences in monitoring costs between agricul-
tural and nonagricultural loans, thereby encouraging di-
versificaion and narrowing the difference in agricultural
loan portfolio shares between rural and urban banks.
• Competition in the agricultural loan market. If competi-
tion from other lenders in agriculture increases and
forces agricultural interestrates downward, thebank will
shift its portfolio awayfrom agriculture.
• Government subsidies or guarantees for crops. An in-
crease in government agricultural support, which stabi-
lizes farm income, should decrease the relative risk of
agricultural lending and increase bank willingness to
lend to agriculture.
Graphical Solution
The bank's portfolio choice can be depicted graphically.
This helps to illustrate the effect of location and branching
restrictions on loan portfolio choice.
Figure 1 breaks total profits into its two component
parts. The vertical axis measures expected profits, while
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portfolio, ranging from 0 to 100percent. The curve labeled
'ITA denotes total expected profits from agricultural lend-
ing. Expected profits from that source rise as more loans
are made to agriculture, but the marginal profits begin to
diminish as the benefits of diversification are lost. Sim-
ilarly, the curve labeled 'ITN measuresexpected profits from
nonagricultural lending, which fall as more of the portfolio
is shifted into agriculture. The total profits for the bank are
the vertical sum of the 'ITA and 'ITN curves. Expected total
profits, 'IT, are maximized at e* .15
Differences in bank locations can result in different
optimal portfolios. Figure 2 compares two stylized banks,
one urban (denoted with a U superscript) and the other
rural (denoted with an R superscript). The rural bank is
assumed to have lower monitoring costs for agricultural
loans, while the urban bank has lower costs for non-
agricultural loans. The effect ofthis assumption is to yield
an expected agricultural profit function for the rural bank
that lies above that of the urban bank ('IT~ > 'IT;';), while the
nonagricultural loan profit function of the urban bank
exceeds that of the rural bank ('IT};; > 'IT~ ) at any given level
ofe. As shown in Figure 2, these differences result in the
urban bank lending less to agriculture.
Changes in monitoringcosts (or other key variables) can
change a bank's portfolio. Consider the case of changes in
relative monitoring costs due to liberalizationof branching
restrictions. Figure 3 depicts the situation facing an urban
bank that is suddenly permitted to open or acquire a rural
branch. Monitoring costs fall for agricultural loans, be-
cause the bank now has a monitoring presence in an
agricultural area.
The drop in monitoring costs pushes 'ITA up to 'IT~ and
raises the total profit function to 'IT' from 'IT. The optimal
allocation of credit, therefore, shifts in the direction of
greater diversification, which, for the urban bank, corre-
sponds to more agricultural lending (e*' > e*).
H. The Data and the Empirical Model
In Section I we suggest that differences in location and
branching restrictions, among other factors, are likely to
help explain differences in bank portfolios. In this section,
we choose empirical counterparts for these factors and
present an empirical model of differences in commercial
banks' agricultural production loans as a proportion of
total Ioans.!s The model seeks to explain deviations in
banks' agricultural portfolio shares from the average for
the sample.
We model bank agricultural production loan portfolio
shares as functions of exogenous factors which influence
relative monitoring costs for the two types of loans, or
interestrate spreads, or the relative amountand cost of risk
for the two loan types.
Ourempirical model is similarto Gilbert and Belongia's
model in that, like these authors, we are modeling the
relationship between the geographic dispersion of bank
offices and bank loan portfolio choice. Three important
factors distinguish our model from Gilbert and Belongia's
model, however. First, we include urban banks in our
study, while Gilbert and Belongia do not. If we find that
urban banks respond to branching opportunities by hold-
ing more agricultural loans, we can better argue that it is
the benefits ofdiversification that drive the results than if
28 Economic Review / Winter 1991we only have evidence on the response of rural banks to
branching opportunities.
The second difference between the two models is that
Gilbertand Belongia donotplacetheir modelinthecontext
of a bank portfolio choice model. Thus, we include some
importantexplanatory variables that are notincluded in the
Gilbert and Belongia model.'? The third difference be-
tween the two models is that we look at the effects of
branching laws per se, while Gilbert and Belongia look at
the effects of affiliation with a multi-bank bank holding
company.
The Variables
The explanatory variables of greatest interest to us
involve the location of the bank and the branching laws in
the state in which the bank operates. As discussed above,
whether a bank is located in a metropolitan or rural area
should influence its cost of monitoring agricultural loans
and thus its agricultural production loan share.
Holding other factors constant, it is expected that a
metropolitan bank will havea loweragricultural loanshare
than a rural bank, because it will find it relatively more
difficult to monitor agricultural loans. However, if the
metropolitan bankis located in astatewide branching state,
we expect that it will have a higher agricultural loan share
than if it is located in a limited branching or unit banking
state. Likewise, we expect that a rural bank will have a
lower agricultural loan share in a statewide branching state
than in a restricted branching state.18
Thus, weinclude three interaction terms, one indicating
whether the bank is a metropolitan bank in a restricted
branching state, one indicating whether the bank is a rural
bank in a restricted branching state, and one indicating
whether the bank is a metropolitan bank in a statewide
branching state. These are all thought to influencerelative
monitoring costs and thereby the proportion of the loan
portfolio devoted to agriculture. (This leavesrural banks in
statewide branching states as the control group.)
We also include the percent of gross state product
accounted for by agriculture, bank size and average farm
size in the regression. All three variables may influence
relative monitoring costs. The first is an important addi-
tionallocation variable; banks that are located in "farm
states" should have lower monitoring costs for agricultural
loans and thus higher agricultural loan shares than banks
located in nonfarm states.
Banksizeand average farm size are included to allowfor
thepossibility that there are economies ofscale in monitor-
ing.'? Figures reported by "The Survey of Terms of Bank
Lending" indicate that there may be consistently large
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differences in average loan sizes between commercial and
agricultural loans, and that this difference is more pro-
nounced for large banks than for small banks.20 This
means that if large loans have lower monitoring costs per
dollar than small loans, then, all other things equal, large
banks would have a comparative advantage in commercial
loans and would devote a smaller proportion of their
portfolio to agricultural loans than would small banks.
In addition, if large farms require large loans, then an
increase in average farm size may lower monitoring costs
on agricultural loans relative to nonagricultural loans,
thereby increasing agriculture's portfolio share.
On the other hand, it is possible that an increase in
average farm size would decrease agriculture's portfolio
share through its influence on the demand for bank loans.
As stated in the introduction, banks may have a compara-
tive advantage in lending to borrowers who are especially
costly to monitor. Tothe extent that farm size is positively
correlated with ease of monitoring, large farm borrowers
may have less need for banks' special monitoring capabili-
ties. They mayhavegreater access toother types oflenders
and may therefore have less of a demand for bank loans.
The remaining variables in our regression should in-
fluence either interest rate spreads or relative risk factors
between the two types of loans. We include one variable
that may influence interest rate spreads: competition from
nonbank agricultural lenders, specifically, the FarmCredit
System (FCS). In a survey of several California banks'
agricultural lending, respondents noted that they face vig-
orous competition from the government-sponsored FCS.21
(See Box for a briefdescription of the types of agricultural
lenders, including the FCS.)
Such competition lowers the relative return that banks
receive on agricultural loans. As pointed out by Gray,
Woolridge, and Ferrara (1982), the FCS has some advan-
tages over commercial banks in lending to agriculture.
Its advantages help it to be an effective competitor with
banks, thereby lowering equilibrium rates of return on
agricultural loans. These include access to the national
money markets through a government-sponsored entity,
favorable tax treatment, and the absence of the loans-to-
one-borrower limits that are imposed on nationally char-
tered commercial banks. 22
The FCS's competitive disadvantages include strict eli-
gibility restrictions for FCS loans to ensure that it remains
only an agricultural lender, an obligation to serve all
agricultural areas during all economic times and an in-
ability to provide the full range of services provided by
commercial banks. 23
Wemeasure the degree of competition from the FCS by
29the percent of total agricultural production loans outstand-
ing in the state that were held by the PCS in the previous
year. Weexpect this variable to havea negative coefficient.
We use the lagged PCS market share rather than the
contemporaneous market share because the contempo-
raneous share likely is a function of the dependent variable
in the regression. Moreover, it is in the nature of lending
relationships that the short-term price elasticity of demand
would be relatively low,so the lagged PCS share should be
strongly positively correlated with current competition
facing banks. 24
Our risk-related variables are the share of government
payments in farm net income and the bank's deposit-to-
loan ratio. An increase in the share of government guaran-
tees (through price supports or export subsidies) should
decrease the levelof risk in agricultural lending and should
increase agriculture's portfolio share.
The deposit-to-loan ratio is included to capture firm-
specific differences in attitudes toward risk. Such differ-
ences may depend on management's goals concerning, for
example, firm growth. Generally, the more "aggressive"
the bank, the more it depends on borrowed funds, rather
than just deposits, for loan funding. We consider such
aggressiveness to be a sign that, given the variances of
project returns, a relatively low cost is assigned to overall
portfolio risk. other words, the parameter 13 in our
theoretical model is relatively low.)
30 Economic Review / Winter 1991A decrease in the expected cost of bankruptcy, holding
variances constant, would induce a bankto invest more in
the projects with higher risk and higher contract interest
rates.s> Therefore, if agricultural loans tend to havehigher
interest rates, an increase in the deposit-to-loan ratio,
corresponding to an increase in the cost assigned to bank-
ruptcy, would decrease the agricultural loan portfolio
share. If, on the otherhand, commercial loans tend to have
higher risk and higher interest rates, an increase in the
deposit-to-loan ratio would increase the agricultural loan
portfolio share. 26 We do not predict the sign of the coeffi-
cient for the deposit-to-loan ratio.
One variable not included explicitly in the model is the
interest rate spread. This variable is excluded because of
data limitations. The appropriate variable to include is
bank-specific and not directly obtainable. The relevant
spread depends on the bank's alternatives to agricultural
loans-bethey commercial, real estateor consumerloans.
We do not have this information, nor do we have the
relevant interest rates for each type of loan for each bank.
We would like to pointout that the narrow categorization
ofseveralof the variables in the regressionis mainly for the
sake of exposition. Specifically, bank size, the deposit-to-
loan ratio and average farm size may work through any or
all of the monitoring costs, interest rate spread, or risk
channels to influence the agricultural portfolio share. For
example, examination of several years of data from the
Survey of Terms of Bank Lending reveals that large farm
loans tend to carry lower interest rates than small loans.27
Therefore, if farm size is positively correlated with loan
size, then farm size may be negatively correlated with
interest rates on farm loans.
This caveat means that the coefficients on the bank
size, deposit-to-loan ratio and average farm size variables
should be interpreted with caution. These are reduced-
form coefficients, not structural coefficients. Most impor-
tant, their interpretation does not affect the interpretation
ofcoefficients on the main variables of interest, the loca-
tion and branching law interaction terms, and agriculture's
share of gross state product.
The Data
We examine a subset of a sample of commercial banks
that the Federal Reserve's Board of Governors has deter-
minedare representative of banks making farm production
loans.28 This sample consists of the banks that were
surveyed on the quarterly FR 2028b, the Survey of Terms
ofBankLending to Agriculture, between 1981and 1986.29
The FR2028b surveys between 168 and 188 banks in each
quarter. The set of banks can differ from survey to survey,
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with some banks reporting data throughout the sample
period and other banks reporting only once or twice.
There are 1069 observations in our sample. A bank was
included in our sample for a particular year if it reported
having outstanding fixed or variable rate agricultural pro-
ductionloans on the FR2028bin at leastone quarterof that
year. In total, banks in 33 states are represented.?" (The
remaining states were not represented because they either
had-less' than 2 percent of their gross state product in
agriculture,or they had no banks surveyed in the sample.)
Forpurp()ses of our analysis it is importantthat the sam-
pleofbanks be fairly evenly divided between banks with
their head offices in metropolitan areas (565 observations)
andth()selocated in rural areas (504 observations). The
breakdown between banks located in restricted branching
states and statewide branching states is 811 and 258,
respectively.
Our dependent variable, the share of agricultural pro-
duction loans in total loans, bank assets, and the deposit-
to-loan ratio were an obtained from data reported on
31Figure 4
State Branching Laws in 1986
o
o Statewide Limited Unit
the quarterly "Report of Condition and Income (Call
Report)." These items were averaged for the entire year to
generate annual figures. The branching law variables were
obtained from various editions of the Annual Statistical
Digest, published by the Boardof Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
The percent of gross state product in agriculture was
obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the
U.S. Department of Labor. Average farm size and the
percent of state farm income from government payments
were obtained from Agricultural Statistics, published by
the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The Farm Credit
System market share was obtained from editions of Agri-
cultural Finance Statistics. Both of these publications are
publishedannually by the U.S. Departmentof Agriculture.
Figure 4 shows the branching laws for all the states in
1986. (Unit and limited branching states are considered
restricted branching states.) Table I presents the mean
values forthe agricultural production loan share and forthe
continuous independentvariables. Means are given forthe
entire sample and for subsamples broken down by bank
headquarters location and branching law status. Note the
large differences in agricultural production loan shares
between rural and urban banks. Also, urban banks in the
32
sample are significantly larger than rural banks, especially
in statewide branching states. We control for this dif-
ference in the regression.
The Empirical Model
The dependent variable in our regression is the dif-
ference between the bank's agricultural production loan
portfolio share and the mean value of this variable for all
banks in the sample forthat year.All explanatory variables
except the location and the branching law interaction terms
also are expressed as deviations from sample means.
Expressing variables as deviations from means helps to
control for macroeconomic effects such as agricultural
business cycles and government policy cycles for which
we have inadequate empirical measures.
The regression equation that we estimate is:
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION LOAN SHARE
Bl*ASSETS +
B2*DEPOSIT-TO-LOAN RATIO +
B3*AGRICULTURE'S SHARE OF GROSS STATE
PRODUCT +
B4*AVERAGE FARM SIZE +
B5*GOVERNMENT SUPPORT +
Economic Review / Winter 1991B6*LAGGED FARM CREDIT SYSTEM SHARE OF
FARM LOANS +
B7*RESTRICTED BRANCHING, RURAL +
B8*RESTRICTED BRANCHING, URBAN +
B9*STATEWIDE BRANCHING, URBAN +
E,
where AGRICULTURALPRODUCTIONWAN SHARE
= percent of total loans outstanding in agricultural
production loans;
ASSETS = bank assets, in billions of dollars;
DEPOSIT-TO-LOAN RATIO = the ratio of total de-
posits to total loans outstanding, in percent (positively
correlated with the cost of risk);
AGRICULTURE'S SHARE OF GROSS STATE PROD-
UCT = for the state in which the bank is located, the
percent of gross state product that is accounted for by
agriculture;
AVERAGE FARM SIZE = average farm size in the
state in 1978, in acres;
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT the share of govern-
ment payments in total state farm net income, inpercent;
LAGGEDFARMCREDITSYSTEMSHAREOFFARM
WANS the percent of total agricultural production
loans outstanding in the state held by the FCS in the
previous year;
RESTRICTED BRANCHING, RURAL = I if the
bank's main office is not in a Metropolitan Statistical
Area and if it is in a unit banking or limited branching
state, 0 otherwise;"
RESTRICTED BRANCHING, URBAN = I if the
bank's main office is in a Metropolitan Statistical Area
and if it is in a unit banking or limited branching state, 0
otherwise;
STATEWIDEBRANCHING, URBAN = 1if thebank's
main office is in a Metropolitan Statistical Area and if it
is in a statewide branching state, 0 otherwise;
and E is an error term.
Our method of estimation was ordinary least squares.
Because of the sample composition, we did not have a
"panel" data set giving a consistent time series for each
bank.V Therefore, we could not perform the usual correc-
tions for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation that are
done for time-series, cross-section regressions.
III. Regression Results
The regression results are reported in Table 2. In gen-
eral, the results provide strong evidence to support the
importance of location in explaining differences in bank
portfolios. As indicated by the adjusted R2 , the equation
explains 64 percent of the variation in agricultural loan
portfolio shares.
Coefficients on the three interactive dummies indicate
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the importance of location and restrictions on branching.
All three are highly significant with the predicted signs.
Results in Table 2 are consistent with the hypothesis
that location, through its influence on relative monitor-
ing costs, is an important determinant of bank portfolio
choice, even when branching is permitted. Urban banks
have significantly smaller portfolio shares in agricultural
33loans than rural banks, ranging from 5.3 percentage points
smaller in statewide branching states to 19.3 percentage
points smaller in restricted branching states.
Branching restrictions work in the expected direction.
To the extent that branching allows urban banks to reduce
the costs of monitoring agricultural loans and rural banks
to lower monitoring costs for nonagricultural loans, unre-
stricted urban banks would be expected to have greater
agricultural loan portfolio shares than restricted urban
banks, and unrestricted rural banks would have smaller
agricultural shares than restricted rural banks. As shownin
Table 2, holding other factors constant, unrestricted urban
banks would hold 4.3 percentage points more of their port-
folio in agricultural loans than restricted urban banks. 33
Likewise, unrestricted rural banks wouldhold 9.7 percent-
age points less oftheir portfolio in agricultural loans than
restricted rural banks. These effects are responsible for the
considerably smaller difference in agricultural shares be-
tween urban and rural unrestricted banks than between
urban and rural restricted banks.
As discussed above, monitoring costs for agricultural
loans should be influenced not only by the location of the
bank within the state, be it urban or rural, but also by the
agricultural orientation of the state's economy as a whole.
The regression results in Table 2 show that, as expected,
AGRICULTURE'S SHARE OF GROSS STATE PROD-
UCT has a positive and highly significant coefficient.
Other factors besides bank location and branching laws
mayaffectfarm productionloanportfolioshares. Although
the coefficient onASSETS is insignificant, indicating that
bank size does not appear to affect relative monitoring
costs in such a wayas to significantly influence agricultural
portfolio shares, AVERAGEFARM SIZE has a significant
negative coefficient. This sign is consistent with the
hypothesis that large farm borrowers may demand fewer
bank loans.
One of the risk-relatedvariables, GOVERNMENTSUP-
PORT, has a statistically significant coefficient. As ex-
pected' thesign is positive, indicating that such payments
decrease the relative risk of agricultural loans, thereby
making them more attractive investments. The other risk-
related variable, the DEPOSIT-TO-LDAN RATIO, has an
insignificant coefficient.
As discussed above, the interest rates on agricultural
loans relative to nonagricultural loans for commercial
banks should be negatively correlated with the lagged
Farm Credit Share of the agricultural loan market. As
expected, the regression results do show a negative and
significant coefficient for LAGGED FARM CREDIT
SYSTEM SHARE OF FARM LDANS.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we present empirical evidence to support
the hypothesis that location, through its effect on relative
monitoring costs, affects bank loan portfolio choice. We
also present evidence that branching restrictions, by con-
fining the location of bank officesto arelatively small area,
inhibits bank loan portfolio diversification.
Specifically, we find that rural banks devote a larger
proportion of their loan portfolio to agricultural loans than
do urban banks. Moreover, wefindthat, when branching is
unrestricted, rural banks hold higher nonagricultural loan
portfolio shares, andurban banks hold higher agricultural
loan portfolio shares. As a result, the allocation of loan
portfolios across agricultural and nonagricultural loans is
more similar for urban and rural banks that are not con-
strained in their ability to branch than it is for constrained
urban and rural banks.
Within the context of our theoretical model, our empiri-
(
cal results indicate that a move to statewide branching
causes banks to diversify their loan portfolios. By permit-
ting banks to locate branches near both agricultural and
nonagricultural borrowers, statewide branching narrows
the difference in monitoring costs between agricultural and
nonagricultural loans foragiven bank. As demonstrated in
34
the theoretical model, differences in monitoring costs
cause rural banks toconcentrate more on agricultural loans
and urban banks to concentrate more on nonagricultural
loans than they would were their portfolio perfectly di-
versified. Therefore, the convergence of relative monitor-
ing costs increases rural bank lending to nonagricultural
projects and urban bank lending to agricultural projects,
thereby increasing diversification. Given this interpreta-
tion, we can say that the benefits of intrastate branching
liberalization would include the benefits that accompany
asset diversification. Among these are a decrease in the
risk of credit disruption as a result of bank failure and a
decrease in the expected withdrawals from the deposit
insurance fund.
Although our results are broadly consistent with those
found by Gilbert and Belongia, our inclusion of urban
banks in the study has enabled us to provide stronger
confirmation of the hypothesis that branching restric-
tions constrain asset diversification. Previous authors
made this conjecture, but did not provide any strong
empirical evidence.
We also find evidence supporting the general conclu-
sions of the theoretical model regarding the effect of
Economic Review / Winter 1991relative rates of return and relative risks on bank loan
portfolio choice. Specifically, we find that factors that
presumably decrease the relative rate of return on agri-
cultural loans, such as an increase in the Farm Credit
System's competitiveness, have a statistically significant
negative effect on agricultural loan portfolio shares. In
addition, an increase in government agricultural supports,
which likely is associated with a decrease in the relative
riskiness of agricultural loans, has astatistically significant
positive effect on a bank's agricultural lending. These
results lend support to our theoretical model and, thus, our
interpretation of the effects of location and branching laws
on bank portfolio diversification.
NOTES
1. Slack's work also suggests that banks would have a
comparative advantage, all other things equal, overother
financial intermediaries in the credit evaluation and moni-
toringprocess. For further discussion and evidence on
banks' comparative advantage in monitoring, see Fama
(1985) and James (1987).
2. See Keeley and Zimmerman (1985) and Neuberger
and Zimmerman (1990) for evidence on the extent of
geographic markets for different types of deposits.
3. Throughout this paper, in both the theoretical discus-
sion and in the empirical work, we equate rural areas with
agricultural areas. Seeendnote 18for adiscussion of how,
ideally, one might deal with this issue.
4. As stated in the introduction, this may be especially
true if borrowers tend to be depositors, and if deposit
markets are local.
5. We have some evidence that metropolitan banks with
branches in rural areas are quite active in agricultural
lending in some states. California is an example. Zimmer-
man (1989) reports that although the proportion of large
metropolitan California banks' loans in agriculture is quite
small, these banks held almost 88 percent ofthe commer-
cial bank total of $2.6 billion in outstanding agricultural
production loans in the state in 1989.
6. Smith (1987) finds empirical evidence that banks in
restricted branching states are generally at greater risk of
closure than are banks in statewide-branching states.
However, the link between branching laws and diver-
sification is not strongly drawn.
7. The model presented in this section is very similar to
the model of bank loan portfolio choice presented in
Gruben, Neuberger and Schmidt (1990).
8. An alternative would be to have the level of monitoring
be a decision variable for the bank, with increases in
monitoring imposing costs, but also yielding benefits in
the form of decreased project return variances. Such a
treatment is beyond the scope of this paper.
9. It is important to note that the returns under discussion
here are the returns to project owners, as opposed to
returns to the bank. Projects may yield returns to their
owners that exceed the contract loan rate, but the most
the bank can receive, net of costs, is the contract loan
rate.
10. Forexample, managers mayface some sortofreputa-
tional penalty should their bank fail.
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11. Itmay be argued that although diversification theory
applies to investors, it does not apply to individual firms,
such as banks. According to this view, bank equity hold-
ers are the decision-making agents in the bank, and their
objective is to have the bank make loan allocations that
yield the maximum risk-adjusted expected return on their
entire portfolio. Because these investors can be expected
to hold more than the stock of the one bank in their
portfolios, the argument goes, their objectives will not
necessarily be consistent with having the bank maximize
the risk-adjusted return on the bank portfolio in isolation.
For this reason, those who model bank behavior some-
times assume that the bank should properly have a risk-
neutral objective function, and thus should maximize
expected return without anyconcern for risk. Itisassumed
that if investors are risk-averse, they can adequately
hedge any risk in one bank's stock returns with invest-
ments in other firms.
However, several arguments have been made explain-
ing why risk may indeed enter into the bank's assetchoice
decision. For example, if the bank would face bankruptcy
costs should it turn out that its net worth is negative, then
an increase in the variance of the bank's portfolio will
actually lower itsexpected return. Inthis case, diversifica-
tion within the bank's portfolio again becomes important.
(See Santomero (1984),for a more detailed discussion of
this issue.) In this paper, we will assume that this sort of
mechanism is at work.
12. Even if loan returns are not negatively correlated,
diversification can often reduce portfolio risk. As long as
the returns on new and existing loans are not perfectly
positively correlated, then, given the distribution of the
returns on new loans, and their covariance with the return
on the existing portfolio, there exists a set of non-zero
weights to attach to new and existing loans such that the
variance of a combined portfolio is less than the variance
of the existing portfolio.
13. It must be emphasized, that, under different assump-
tions for relative interest rates, monitoring costs, and
covariances, portfolio variance would not necessarily be
minimized by devoting exactly one-half of the portfolio to
agriculture.
14. A bank may have centralized credit policies or credit
approval processes that make the location of the bank
headquarters important.
3515. The solution depends on the relative curvature of the
two individual profit functions. A major factor causing the
functions to be concave is the importance of bankruptcy
costs, 13. As 13 increases, the functions become more
concave, making it more likely that diversification will
take place.
16. The other type of agricultural loan is an agricul-
tural loan secured by real estate, which typically has a
much longer maturity than an agricultural production loan
(about 15 years versus about one year). We focus on
agricultural production loans becausethey are more com-
parable, in maturity, with the commercial loans that we
envision as the alternative asset. In addition, commercial
banks are more involved in agricultural production lend-
ing than in agricultural real estate lending, as measured
by market share. Over the years 1981-1986 (the years
which we study), an average of 9.35 percent of total
agricultural real estate loans were held by commercial
banks. The corresponding figure for agricultural produc-
tion loans was 41.7 percent. (Source: Sullivan, 1990.)
17. Gilbert and Belongia's explanatory variables are lim-
ited to variables related to bank holding company size
andthe length of time that a bankhas been affiliated with a
bank holding company.
18. Implicitly, we are equating rural areas with agricultural
areas. Ideally, we would use county-level information on,
for example, agriculture's share of total personal income,
to refine our definition of an agricultural area. However, we
donot have such information for every county inour study.
On the surface, an alternative may be to use the entire
state's share of agriculture in gross state product to
measurethe degree to which rural areas in the state are in
fact engaged in agriculture. However, this is not likely to
be a good indicator of agricultural activity in rural areas.
This is because a state is likely to have a low agricultural
gross state product share not because its rural areas are
not engaged in agriculture, but because the contribution
of industry to the state's economy is more important than
the contribution of agriculture. California, with approxi-
mately a 2 percent share of agriculture in gross state
product, is an example of such a state.
19. This notion was not incorporated into the theoretical
model. There, a change inthe proportion of funds devoted
to agricultural loans, holding loan size constant, did not
affect monitoring costs per dollar for agricultural loans.
Likewise, a change in average agricultural loan size,
holding the total proportion of the portfolio devoted to
agriculture constant, did not affect monitoring costs per
dollarfor agricultural loans. Allowing for such effects in the
theoretical model would have unnecessarily complicated
the model, given that the main focus is on the relationship
between monitoring costs and location.
20. For example, figures for loans made during one week
in August in each of the years 1981 to 1986 reveal the
following: Averaged over all six years, for the 48 large
banks surveyed, the average size of short-term commer-
cial and industrial loans was $1.433 million, the average
size of long-term commercial and industrial loans was
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$1.093 million, and the average size of farm loans was
$73,000. For small and medium sized banks, the corre-
sponding numbers were $68,000, $62,000 and $12,000.
Moreover, the pattern was consistent over all six years.
(Source: Survey of Terms of Bank Lending.)
21. Source: Informal survey conducted by Federal Re-
serve Bankof San Franciscoof six majorcommercial bank
agricultural lenders in the Twelfth Federal Reserve Dis-
trict, March 1990.
22. Nationally chartered banks may lend no more than
the value of 10percentof their capital to anyone borrower.
23. In addition, the FCShas a requirement that borrowers
purchase stock in the organization. (See Box.) Under
certain circumstances this too can be detrimental to its
competitiveness. If farmers fear substantial losses on any
FCSbank stock, they may "run" on the bank, rushing to
payoff loans and redeem their stock at full price. This
effort is most feasible for the financially strongest bor-
rowers, so any exodus would leave behind the most
troubled borrowers, exacerbating bank losses. Commer-
cial banks do not face the possibility of runs by their
borrowers, and deposit insurance protects them from
runs by their depositors. Also, until recently the FCS has
followed the practice of setting its loan rate based on
its historical average cost of funds. This meant that, in
periods of falling interest rates, the FCS was less competi-
tive with commercial banks, who are more apt to priceon a
marginal cost basis.
24. According to the theory of financial intermediation
outlined in the introduction to this paper, banks provide
credit to borrowers who are unable to obtain funds by
issuing their own debt. A bank is willing to lend to such a
borrower because it has special credit evaluation and
monitoring capabilities that are specific to that borrower.
A relatively low short-term interest rate elasticity of de-
mand is consistent with this theory; a borrower could
expect that although another lender may offer a lower
interest rate, other terms of the contract may be less
favorable dueto the new lenderbeing less familiarwith the
borrower. For example, a borrower may rationally have
loyalty to his lender born of experience that shows that the
lender "stands by" the borrower in difficult times. A lender
that has not had a long-term relationship with the borrower
would not be expected to be as accommodating. Agricul-
tural lending relationships seem to be particularly stable;
an official of one commercial bank involved in agricultural
lending stated that in order to win over a customer from
another lender you often have to call on the customer for
three or four years.
25. We assume that investing in the higher interest rate
projectsalso addsto portfolio risk and/orraises the proba-
bility of project defaults. If it did not, then the bank would
already have invested its entire portfolio in the projects
with the highest interest rates, and changing the cost
assigned to bankruptcy would not affect its portfolio.
26. Another variable that may affect the cost of risk to the
bankisthe capital-to-asset ratio. We included this variable
in some versions of our regression, but this did not signifi-
Economic Review / Winter 1991cantly affect the results we report here. Therefore, we
report only the version of the regression that excludes the
capital-to-asset ratio.
27. For example, for farm loans made by large banks
during the week of August 4, 1986, weighted average
interest rates for six size classes decreased monotoni-
cally from 10.57 percent for $1 ,000to $3,000 loansto 8.94
percent for loans of at least $250,000. (Source: Surveyof
Terms of Bank Lending, August 4-8, 1986.)
28. By restricting our sample to defined "agricultural
lenders,": we may be introducing selectivity bias into
our regression estimation. However, we believe that our
model is more applicable to banks that do some agri-
culturallending than it is to banks that do none at all, and
that the determination of whether a bank does agricultural
lending can be separated from the determination of how
much agricultural lending it does.
29. These banks account for about one-third of total
commercial bank agricultural lending nationwide.
30. It may be noted that agricultural loan market condi-
tions experienced a severe downturn during our sample
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period due to a significant decrease in the trend of
expected earnings and a consequent plunge inthe value
of farmland. (See Melichar (1986) and Melichar (1987)
for discussions of this period of financial stress in agri-
culture.) However, we do not believe that this biases
our results.
31 .•Metropolitan Statistical Area is a designation as-
signed to counties or areas of contiguous counties by the
Census Bureau.
32. Because some banks appear more than once in our
dataset, we do not have completely independent obser-
vations.However, because bank size and the deposit-to-
loan ratio should be fairly constant over time for each
bank, the inclusion of these variables in the regression
should help to control for firm-specific effects.
33. The difference between the coeffients on the re-
stricted branching, urban location variable and the state-
wide branching, urban location variable is statistically
significant.
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